Remuneration Policy
The following section sets out 4imprint Group plc's Directors' Remuneration Policy (the "Policy") which will be subject to a binding shareholder vote at the AGM in 2021 and will take effect from the date of the AGM.
Overview of key changes
The Committee has reviewed the Policy against evolving governance guidelines and market practice and has updated several elements of the Policy to bring it further in line with 'best practice', for example, introduction of a clawback provision on the Deferred Annual Bonus Plan (or DABS); expansion of the 'trigger' events for malus and clawback; increased shareholding guideline limits; and introduction of a post-employment shareholding guideline.
In addition, we have added further explanatory details throughout the report for improved clarity around the Policy's operation (for example, we have expanded the sections on Executive Director recruitments and departures), as well as refreshing the format and style of the report to improve readability.
In addition to changes to the report and policy detail, we have made some changes to the operation of the Policy, as set out below:
Element of Policy |
Overview of changes proposed to Policy |
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Deferred |
Annual Bonus |
• No increase to ongoing award levels for the current Executive Directors for |
|
Plan (DABS) |
FY21 (maximum opportunity of 100% of salary). |
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• Introduction of an overall award limit of 150% of salary for use in future |
|||
years to maintain the ongoing competitiveness of the DABS for the 3-year |
|||
life of this Policy. |
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• No change to the 5-year deferral policy. |
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Shareholding guidelines |
• Shareholding guidelines have been increased from 100% of salary to 200% |
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of salary. Executive Directors will have until their fifth annual bonus share |
|||
award grant to accumulate their shareholding and at least 50% of all share |
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incentives (net of tax) will be held back in order to assist the Executive |
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Directors to accumulate their holdings. |
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• Post-employment shareholding guidelines have also been introduced. |
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Executive Directors will be expected to hold 200% of salary in Company |
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shares for 1 year from cessation of employment and hold 100% of salary |
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for a further year (a 2-year period in total). The post-employment |
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shareholding guideline will apply to all DABS awards granted after the date |
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of this Policy's approval. |
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Malus |
and |
clawback |
• Introduction of a clawback provision and expansion of the malus and |
provisions on the DABS |
clawback 'trigger' events. |
Principles of Policy
The Committee is made up entirely of independent Non-Executive Directors to avoid any conflicts of interest and no individual is present at a Committee meeting where their own remuneration is discussed. The Committee ensures that it is kept up to date with published guidance from investors and shareholder representative bodies and current market practice, so that it can bear these factors in mind when formulating, and making decisions in connection with, the Policy. [Schedule 8 para 24(1A)]
The guiding principles underlying the Policy are:
- remuneration should be competitive when compared to remuneration in organisations of similar size and complexity in the relevant external market, without paying more than is necessary;
- subject to satisfying (i) above, remuneration should be considered in the context of wider employee pay and conditions and shareholder views;
- packages should be structured so that remuneration is aligned to both the strategy of the Company and long- term growth in Shareholder value;
- each element of the remuneration package should be clear, easy to understand and motivating;
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- the overall package should be designed to take account of the performance of the business, to respond to regulatory changes but not to promote undesirable behaviour or to encourage unacceptable risk taking; and
- packages should be structured to avoid reward for failure.
Executive Director Policy Table
Element and |
Opportunity |
Operation |
Performance Measures |
purpose |
|||
Base salary |
Base salaries are reviewed |
Base salary increases will not |
Not applicable |
Enables |
annually however increases are |
normally exceed the average |
|
4imprint to |
not automatic. |
increase awarded to the wider |
|
attract and |
Base salary adjustments reflect |
workforce. However, in |
|
retain executive |
various factors, including |
exceptional circumstances |
|
talent |
increases for other employees |
salary increases may exceed |
|
across the 4imprint business; |
this level. |
||
individual and Company |
|||
performance; changes in role |
|||
and responsibilities; and pay at |
|||
companies of a similar size and |
|||
complexity in the relevant |
|||
external market. |
|||
Base salaries should be |
|||
competitive when compared to |
|||
similar roles at organisations of a |
|||
similar size and complexity in the |
|||
relevant external market. |
|||
Base salary increases are also |
|||
considered in the context of the |
|||
value of the total remuneration |
|||
package. |
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Retirement |
Executive Director retirement |
Executive Directors are eligible |
Not applicable |
benefits |
benefits are limited to the |
either (i) to participate in local |
|
To provide a |
opportunity offered to the local |
Company pension |
|
competitive |
workforce. This is currently |
arrangements, or (ii) subject to |
|
level of |
capped at 5% of base salary per |
the discretion of the Committee, |
|
retirement |
annum. |
to receive a salary supplement in |
|
benefit in order |
lieu of pension contributions, |
||
to attract and |
(which is not taken into account |
||
retain executive |
as salary for calculation of |
||
talent |
annual bonus, or other benefits). |
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Other benefits |
Benefit values are set at an |
Typical benefits may include: (i) |
Not applicable |
To maintain |
appropriate level taking into |
company car or car allowance |
|
competitiveness |
account market practice. |
paid in cash; (ii) private medical |
|
in attracting and |
The Committee reserves the |
insurance for the executive and |
|
retaining talent |
discretion to approve a higher |
his/her family; (iii) life assurance |
|
level of benefits if it is considered |
of up to four times base salary; |
||
by the Committee to be |
(iv) income protection insurance; |
||
necessary, appropriate and in |
and (v) access to independent |
||
the best interests of the |
professional advice when |
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Company and its stakeholders. |
necessary. |
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For example, this may include |
Other benefits may also be |
||
additional benefits to cover the |
offered in line with those offered |
||
cost of relocation or insurance |
to other employees, such as |
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premiums. |
paid holiday. |
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The benefits offering may differ |
|||
to reflect the market practice of |
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Element and |
Opportunity |
Operation |
Performance Measures |
purpose |
|||
the country of employment or |
|||
domicile of the individual |
|||
Director. |
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Deferred |
The ongoing maximum potential |
50% of the annual bonus is |
Performance may be assessed |
Annual Bonus |
annual bonus opportunity is |
delivered in cash. |
using financial and non-financial |
Scheme |
100% of base salary for FY21. |
50% of the annual bonus is |
measures. |
(DABS) |
However, the Policy provides the |
deferred into share awards |
Financial performance |
To encourage |
Committee with an overall |
(generally nil-cost options, |
measures may include: |
share |
maximum of 150% of base |
conditional share awards or |
profitability, revenue growth, |
ownership and |
salary for use in future years, for |
other forms to meet regulatory or |
cash generation, or other |
to incentivise |
example, in a recruitment |
business needs) for 5 years |
financial metrics that are aligned |
and reward |
scenario, or in order to maintain |
following the date of grant. See |
to the business strategy. |
strong annual |
the competitiveness of the bonus |
Leaver Policy for exceptions to |
Financial objectives generally |
performance |
relative to the market taking into |
this rule. |
account for the majority of the |
account Company and individual |
Cash bonus and deferred share |
annual bonus performance |
|
performance and the potential |
awards are typically allocated to |
assessment. |
|
value of the rest of the |
participants following the audit of |
Non-financial, corporate |
|
remuneration package. See |
the Annual Report and Accounts |
objectives may also be used, |
|
Recruitment Policy for further |
in the March following the |
such as environmental, social |
|
details. |
performance period. |
and governance (ESG) metrics |
|
The award for on-target |
The number of nil cost options or |
to the extent that they align with |
|
performance is 50% of base |
the Board's strategy and are |
||
conditional share awards is |
|||
salary where awards are made |
deemed to enhance prospective |
||
in line with the ongoing |
based on the share price on 31 |
long-term growth in Shareholder |
|
maximum opportunity of 100% of |
December of the financial year |
value. |
|
salary. |
to which annual performance |
Performance measures and |
|
Where the overall maximum of |
relates. |
targets are generally set at the |
|
150% is employed, the on-target |
The cash bonus and deferred |
start of the financial year to |
|
bonus opportunity may be |
reflect the group's strategic |
||
share awards are subject to |
|||
increased to 50% of the |
priorities. Further details can be |
||
clawback and malus provisions. |
|||
maximum, being 75% of base |
found in the Annual Report on |
||
See notes to the table. |
|||
salary. |
Remuneration. |
||
Once awarded, the deferred |
|||
component of the annual award |
|||
will not be subject to further |
|||
performance targets. |
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Share Plans |
Employees (including Executive |
Periodic employee share option |
Not applicable |
To encourage |
Directors) may save an agreed |
plans open to all employees are |
|
employee share |
monthly amount, and options are |
operated in the 4imprint Group. |
|
ownership and |
normally granted at a discount of |
These take the form of HMRC |
|
reward long- |
up to 20% to the current share |
approved Sharesave plans in the |
|
term value |
price. |
UK, and equivalent plans in the |
|
creation |
Savings are capped at an |
USA. |
|
agreed monthly contribution rate, |
|||
and the option price is set at the |
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outset of the plan. |
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Share |
Executive Directors are expected |
At least 50% of any vested share |
Not applicable |
ownership |
to maintain a holding of shares in |
awards (net of tax) from |
|
guidelines |
the Company of at least 200% of |
incentive arrangements are |
|
Provides |
annual base salary. |
expected to be held in order to |
|
alignment with |
Executive Directors are also |
accumulate the recommended |
|
shareholders |
expected to maintain a |
personal shareholding. |
|
whilst |
shareholding of at least 200% of |
Executive Directors will have |
|
encouraging |
base salary for 1 year following |
until their fifth annual bonus |
|
sustainable, |
cessation of employment, |
share award grant to accumulate |
|
reduced to a holding of at least |
their shareholding. |
||
3
Element and |
Opportunity |
Operation |
Performance Measures |
purpose |
|||
long-term value |
100% of base salary for the |
The post-employment |
|
creation |
second year following cessation. |
shareholding guideline will be |
|
See Leaver Policy for further |
enforced through contractual |
||
details. |
means. |
||
Notes to the Policy Table
Remuneration |
When assessing incentive plan results and performance, the Committee retains the discretion to |
||
Committee |
reduce (including to nil) incentive pay-out levels if it is considered appropriate in exceptional |
||
discretion |
circumstances, for example, in the context of a significant health and safety failure, or an |
||
exceptional negative event significantly impacting employees or shareholders. |
|||
Malus and Clawback |
Malus and clawback provisions apply to both cash and deferred share elements of the DABS. |
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Malus includes the reduction (including to nil) of in-year and/or future year bonus amounts; and |
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the forfeiture or withholding of unvested deferred share awards and clawback involves the |
|||
recovery of annual bonus amounts that have been paid. Clawback may apply to cash bonus |
|||
payments made up to 2 years after the relevant payment date and for deferred share awards that |
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vested up to 5 years from the relevant grant date. These provisions may be invoked by the |
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Committee if it deems this to be appropriate in the context of one or more 'trigger' events. These |
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include: |
|||
• |
material misstatement (including omission) in the Company's accounts |
||
• |
the bonus/award was based on an error, or inaccurate or misleading information |
||
• |
serious misconduct |
||
• |
corporate failure |
||
• |
serious reputational damage |
||
Discretion to amend |
In the event of a variation in share capital or other event that may affect the share price, the |
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the future operation |
number of shares subject to an award may be adjusted. |
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of the DABS |
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Minor amendments |
Minor changes may be made to the Policy for regulatory or administrative purposes without |
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to the Policy and |
seeking further shareholder approval for such an amendment. |
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remuneration under |
The Committee may make payments notwithstanding that they are not within the current Policy if |
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previous |
they were agreed before: |
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arrangements |
• |
the Company's first remuneration policy subject to binding shareholder approval came into |
|
effect, |
|||
• |
the Policy came into effect (provided they are in line with the remuneration policy at the time |
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of agreement), or |
|||
• |
promotion (of the individual to which the payment relates) to the board of directors. |
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Performance |
The Committee has selected financial measures as the primary method of determining |
||
measures |
performance, as these metrics directly affect shareholder value. The Committee, when setting the |
||
[Schedule 8 para |
relevant targets, takes into account the Company's business plan and internal and external |
||
27(a)] |
forecasts for the business. Strategic performance conditions are set in line with the Company's |
||
business plan and strategic priorities. At the end of the performance period, the Committee will |
|||
review performance against targets and may adjust formulaic outcomes for reasons such as (but |
|||
not limited to) disposals, acquisitions and changes in accounting treatment, if it is considered |
|||
necessary for a fair outcome in the context of wider company performance. Where discretion is |
|||
exercised the rationale and adjustment will be disclosed in the relevant Annual Report. |
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Executive Director Service contracts
Executive Directors have rolling service contracts, notice periods are 12 months from the Company and 6 months from the Executive Director. Any new Executive Director would be appointed on similar terms [Schedule 8 para 30A]. The Executive Directors' service contracts are available for inspection at the Company's registered office.
Executive Director Recruitment Policy
The following guidelines are followed by the Committee when considering the pay and employment terms for a new Executive Director:
- The Committee aims to pay no more than is necessary to secure the right talent for the business
- The ongoing remuneration policy for any new Executive Director will align to the remuneration policy for Executive Directors as set out in this Policy
- Base salaries are set at a market rate in order to attract the appropriate person. Factors to be taken into account include: the individual's previous salary and remuneration package; the skills and experience of the individual; the salary of the previous role incumbent; and pay at organisations of similar size, complexity and sector in the relevant external market.
-
Special arrangements may be made for a new Executive Director in order to secure their appointment. These may include:
o The Committee may choose to provide additional compensation for incentive awards forfeited by the executive upon joining 4imprint. In such cases, we would seek to apply similar conditions to forfeited awards including performance conditions; vesting and holding periods; and form of award. Any 'buyout' payment will be reduced by an equivalent amount in the event the Executive Director's former employer pays a portion of the remuneration that was deemed foregone. Where possible, existing incentive plans will be used to satisfy such awards, however, in the event that this is not appropriate, the Committee retains the right to use the Listing Rules exemption for the purposes of a 'buy-out' award.
o An increased award limit exists under the DABS of 150% of base salary which may be used upon recruitment of a new Executive Director.
o For external and internal appointments, the Committee may agree that the Company will meet certain relocation expenses and legal fees as it considers to be appropriate. Assistance will be subject to reasonable clawback for service of less than 12 months.
Corporate events
Upon a takeover, unvested deferred shared awards under the DABS would normally vest in full immediately. Awards may be exchanged to the extent that an offer to exchange awards for new awards is made and accepted by the award holder.
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4imprint Group plc published this content on 01 November 2021 and is solely responsible for the information contained therein. Distributed by Public, unedited and unaltered, on 01 November 2021 17:13:02 UTC.